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Dear reader
It is a great pleasure to present the second UBS Center Public 
Paper entitled “Fear, Folly, and Financial Crises – Some Policy 
Lessons from History”.
Since the world financial crisis of 2007/08 it has become clear 
that financial crises and the major economic downturns they 
cause happen neither just in distant countries nor in the distant 
past. They are part of the economic realities of developed coun-
tries in the present. 
In this Public Paper, the author presents the latest academic 
insights into the history of financial crises. What can we learn 
from the past when it comes to defining strategies and policies 
for dealing with financial crises? Why is the optimal number of 
financial crises not zero? You will receive the answers to these 
and related questions from Prof. Joachim Voth, a leading spe-
cialist in financial and economic history. 
As in the first paper of this series, the author of this second 
Public Paper is an international top specialist in his field, and 
the Public Paper is written in a clear, compact, and highly read-
able format, free of academic jargon and understandable with-
out prior knowledge about the subject. It therefore meets the 
UBS Center’s aspiration to provide new relevant research find-
ings on key economic topics of our time to a broad audience. 
All that remains is for me to wish you much interest while 
reading it!
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Financial crises devastate human lives, causing 
major shocks to economic output, trade, 
employment, income, and wealth. And as the 
financial crisis of 2007/08 showed, these crises 
do not just happen in distant countries or in 
the distant past – they are part of the eco-
nomic realities of developed countries today. 
It is therefore of paramount importance to 
understand the causes of financial crises, and 
to come up with sound policy advice about 
how to reduce their frequency and depth. 
The present Public Paper looks at the rich his-
tory of financial crises, analyzing both con-
temporary and historical data on financial 
instability, and combining this with insights 
from economic theory. It argues that financial 
folly – collective mass-hysteria in financial 
decision-making – is not a helpful concept for 
understanding financial crises. While changes 
in sentiment occur, and can affect asset prices, 
financial crises are best understood as time- 
and location-specific responses to misaligned 
incentives and poor regulation.
This paper proposes a set of policies, which 
have the potential to reduce the number of 
financial crises and to soften their conse-
quences. The Public Paper also explains why 
regulating crises out of existence would not be 
a good idea.
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Until recently, financial crises and the 
major economic downturns they caused 
seemed as far removed from the eco-
nomic realities of developed countries as 
the Thirty Years War – they happened 
either in distant countries like Mexico or 
Indonesia or in the distant past. This 
changed abruptly after the world finan-
cial crisis of 2007/08. The United States 
and almost all countries in Europe were 
faced with a major shock to output and 
employment that originated in the finan-
cial sector; the aftereffects reverberated in 
debt markets in the eurozone, creating a 
second financial crisis where many gov-
ernments were effectively shut out of 
debt markets. 
Just before the crisis hit, central bankers 
and economists alike had declared that a 
new age of seeming stability and steady 
growth, the “Great Moderation”, was 
upon us – that central bank independence 
coupled with prudent interest rate policy 
and flexible labor markets had banished 
boom and bust cycles for good.1 While 
output and employment were plummet-
ing in the fall of 2008, academic journals 
were publishing papers accepted months 
and years earlier pinpointing the exact 
reasons why even moderate output fluc-
tuations had died down as much as they 
did.2 
Faced with a new, unanticipated phenom-
enon, economists, journalists and policy-
makers began looking for explanations. 
Why did the world find itself in a situa-
tion that looked like a likely repeat of the 
Great Depression of the 1930s? How 
could leading economic powers end up in 
a situation reminiscent of Third World 
countries? As is often the case in times of 
confusion, a single, powerful narrative 
rises to prominence. In this case, it was 
the idea that financial folly – of excessive 
individual risk-taking and collective 
mass-hysteria – is a constant of human 
life, erupting periodically with the same 
inevitability as earthquakes near major 
fault lines. In particular, the influential 
work of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff, based on a close reading of the 
last 800 years of financial chaos, argues 
that the idea that “This Time Is Differ-
ent” has led to repeated swings from sta-
bility to crisis – after each crisis, people 
begin acting cautiously, taking fewer 
risks, and this was combined with good 
regulation.3, 4 Gradually, they convince 
themselves that instability is a matter of 
the past, and thereby sow the seeds of the 
next crisis. The pattern then repeats. 
This survey analyzes both contemporary 
and historical data on financial instabil-
ity. Combined with insights from eco-
nomic theory, it argues that financial 
folly is not a helpful guiding principle for 
interpreting and understanding financial 
crises. While changes in sentiment occur, 
and can affect asset prices, misaligned 
incentives and poor regulation are the 
main drivers of instability. Financial cri-
ses do not share one key underlying 
problem like pervasive financial folly. 
Instead, they are best understood as a mix-
ture of highly time- and location-specific 
factors interacting with more general pat-
terns that produce instability. The pur-
pose of this essay is to uncover what mix 
of institutions and incentives creates 
chaos, and which guiding principles 
should be applied in reducing their 
frequency.
Introduction
5Saying that “stability is easy” sounds 
provocative. But the facts bear it out. Fig-
ure 1 shows the frequency of financial 
crises since the 19th century.5 It shows 
three types of crises – currency crises, 
banking crises, and “twin crises”, when 
both occur simultaneously. 
The remarkable period is 1945–73. There 
were currency crises, but the frequency of 
banking crises was essentially zero, 
except for one crisis. Compared to the 
earlier and later decades, the postwar era 
looks like a miraculous island of tran-
quility. How was this possible? How 
could highly developed countries not just 
grow moderately, but grow rich at the 
highest rate in recorded history without 
major setbacks and crises?
Insight No. 1: Stability is easy
The stability of the Bretton Woods era 
was no accident. When the Western Allies 
discussed how to structure the world 
economy after the defeat of Germany and 
Japan, reducing the frequency and sever-
ity of crises was uppermost in their 
minds. What was the lesson of the calam-
itous 1930s, according to John Maynard 
Keynes, who attended the conference for 
the British side? That there should be no 
more international capital movements in 
the future. International trade? For sure. 
Exchange of ideas across borders? Cer-
tainly. Migration? Perhaps. But flows of 
capital – certainly not. The lesson drawn 
from the Great Depression – and not just 
by Keynes – was that international bor-
rowing had to be avoided at all cost. The 
reason was that “hot money flows” – 
sudden reversals of short-term interna-
tional lending – put pressure on exchange 
rates and undermined the lending capac-
ity of central banks in 1931/32 at exactly 
those moments when it hurt the most.6
It was the IMF (and the World Bank), the 
new institutions of the Bretton Woods 
system, that were tasked with avoiding a 
repeat of the destabilizing cross-border 
flows that had characterized the interwar 
period. Ironically, these were the same 
institutions that came to enshrine the 
“Washington consensus” of the 1990s, 
with free capital flows as an integral fea-
ture. Henry Morgenthau, Treasury Secre-
tary at the time of the Bretton Woods 
Conference, hailed the agreement as hav-
ing succeeded in “driving the usurious 
moneylenders from the temple of interna-
tional finance”.7 
Without free capital flows, currency cri-
ses became nearly impossible for simple 
technical reasons – no speculator could 
move enough money across borders to 
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“attack” a misaligned currency peg. Simi-
larly, banking crises disappeared as a 
result of regulation. Banks were told 
whom to lend to, at what rates, and what 
to pay to depositors. The United States, 
for example, introduced stringent con-
trols on deposit rates, known as Regula-
tion Q. First adopted in 1933, it 
prohibited paying interest on deposit bal-
ances, and was extended to cover various 
forms of deposits.
With competition between banks severely 
limited, profits were virtually guaranteed 
to be high. Banking regulation ensured 
reasonable equity cushions so that even a 
whole string of bad loans would not 
endanger a bank’s survival. In addition, 
profit rates in most firms were high due 
to an implicit deal between “capital” and 
“labor”; self-financing provided a highly 
effective alternative to both bank lending 
and capital raising on the stock market.
Critics of modern capital markets often 
point to the Bretton Woods system as a 
model of good regulation. While it is true 
that financial repression existed side by
side with superior economic growth, 
there was no simple causal connection 
that ran from one to the other. Europe’s 
“super growth” after 1950 had many 
causes. In particular, the great realloca-
tion of labor from agriculture to indus-
try, which had driven growth since the 
start of industrialization, had stopped for 
several decades after World War I. As it 
resumed, growth surged – but in a way 
that was not sustainable ad infinitum. 
There are good reasons to think that mas-
sive fiscal repression came at a cost to the 
European economy. If capital cannot flow 
across borders, the cost of capital will be 
higher for one basic reason – risks that 
could be diversified away in an interna-
tional market remain a problem for the 
(national) investor. He hence has to 
demand a higher return for putting his 
money to work. One simple way of mea-
suring the extent to which restrictions on 
cross-border flows “bite” is to look at 
Architects
Bretton Woods
The Bretton Woods Conference took place in July 1944 at the 
Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The 
conference’s aim was to rebuild the international economic system 
after World War II. The resulting system of rules and institutions be-
came known as the Bretton Woods system and shaped the interna-
tional monetary system up to 1971. This illustration of the hotel orig-
inates from a circa 1910 postcard made by the Detroit Publishing 
Company.
John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was heavily involved, as leader 
of the British delegation and chairman of the World Bank commis-
sion, in the mid-1944 negotiations that established the Bretton 
Woods system. Harry Dexter White (1892–1948), senior U.S. Trea-
sury department official, was the senior American official at the 
1944 Bretton Woods Conference. He dominated the conference 
and imposed his vision of postwar financial institutions over the 
objections of Keynes. The picture shows Assistant Secretary, U.S. 
Treasury, Harry Dexter White (left), and John Maynard Keynes, hon-
orary advisor to the U.K. Treasury in March 1946. 
Source: International Monetary Fund
Source: Hugh Manatee
7the difference between on- and offshore 
interest rates – the differential between 
interest rates paid for a currency in the 
issuing country and in offshore centers. 
The greater the degree of effective control 
over capital controls, the greater the dif-
ferential will be. Figure 2 gives an indica-
tion about how the limited opening up of 
capital markets created some “abnor-
mal” returns of capital. It turns out that 
controls in post-World War II Europe are 
highly correlated with one measure of the 
cost of capital – the price-earnings multi-
ple for stocks. This is an indicator of how 
much investors discount future cash 
flows when they buy equities at any given 
point in time; in a highly risky environ-
ment, for example, stocks typically trade 
at 8 to 9 times earnings, while stable 
stock markets see ratios of 15 or above.
In Western Europe after 1950, fiscal 
repression drove up the cost of equity in 
an important way – the greater the differ-
ential between on- and offshore interest 
rates, the higher the cost of capital as 
measured by the price-earnings ratio.8 
Valuations were artificially depressed, 
raising the cost of internal financing. As 
restrictions on capital mobility were 
gradually relaxed, share prices in Euro-
pean countries surged. This means that 
the Bretton Woods-style model of finan-
cial repression produced important costs. 
These were not readily apparent in the 
1950s and 1960s as the recovery from 
decades of war proceeded apace; but they 
would hamstrung further growth thereaf-
ter. This means that the remarkable sta-
bility of the period was not without cost. 
The absence of banking and currency cri-
ses (as well as major bubbles) avoided 
sharp downturns, but it came at a price 
of reduced economic performance.
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Note: Cumulative abnormal returns (corrected for co-movement with world stock indices) around the introduction of current ac-
count convertibility. Returns have been rescaled to equal zero at the time of introduction of full convertibility (January 1959 for all 
countries except France, which introduced full convertibility in June 1959).
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Insight No. 2: The optimal number 
of financial crises is not zero
A government awards a major contract 
designed to restructure the debts of the 
nation to a company with excellent con-
nections – and no track record in suc-
ceeding in trade. The firm issues many 
new shares, at ever higher prices, and 
offers to buy out sovereign debt holders. 
As stock prices skyrocket, everyone mar-
vels at the ingenuity of the scheme that 
promises to lighten the national debt bur-
den while making many rich. The fact 
that the company in charge bribed minis-
ters, members of parliament, and the 
king’s mistresses probably helps lighten 
the mood. 
Eventually, stock prices start to slide; then, 
they decline more quickly; eventually, 
within a few months, they fall back to their 
precrisis level. The corruption is exposed, 
the leading officers of the company flee, 
ministers lose their positions, and the com-
pany’s treasurer flees abroad. What sounds 
like a mixture of facts from the Enron scan-
dal and reality TV actually happened. The 
time? The year 1720. The firm in question? 
The South Sea Company.9
The South Sea bubble is famous for many 
reasons – it showed a more rapid increase 
in prices than most stocks on the NAS-
DAQ, for example. It also served as an 
example of excesses to avoid for decades. 
One regulation that came out of the 
South Sea episode was the so-called Bub-
ble Act. While it was passed at the com-
pany’s request – in a bid to avoid 
competition from other firms for funds at 
the height of the bubble – it remained on 
the books for a century. By linking a 
firm’s activity closely to its royal charter, 
it effectively prohibited the issuance of 
new equity in England until the early 
19th century.10
Of course, it is hard for bubbles to form 
where there are no stocks. Stability 
reigned to a considerable extent during 
the century while the Bubble Act was in 
force. Combined with other regulations 
that limited the operation of banks – no 
banking firm could have more than six 
partners, for example – and interest rates 
on loans, England’s financial system 
remained highly regulated. At its core, it 
failed at its most basic task – collecting 
savings and channeling these into these 
sectors of the economy that needed them 
the most. 
One simple measure of how poorly finan-
cial resources were allocated during the 
heyday of the Industrial Revolution is the 
return on capital. While high rates of 
return look like a success, they are actu-
ally not – in a functioning market, fresh 
funds would chase these high returns. 
Over time, they would come down as the 
capital stock allocated to new activities 
surges. Eventually, with efficient capital 
allocation, the rate of return would be 
the same everywhere. This is not what 
happened.11
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Fig. 3 The mother of all bubbles: The South Sea bubble in 1720
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Source: Temin and Voth (2004)
9Rates of return on capital surged to very 
high rates after the Industrial Revolution 
got underway, from around 10% p.a. to 
over 23% by the middle of the 19th cen-
tury. Capital also received an ever even 
larger share of the economic pie – it grew 
from 18% to 45% between 1770 and 
1850. This shows just how “hungry” the 
new, thriving industries of the Industrial 
Revolution were for more capital – and 
how poorly the financial system satisfied 
this hunger. In other words, the Industrial 
Revolution transformed the way people 
produced and consumed, not because of 
the virtues of its financial system, but in 
spite of it.12 
In turn, this also implies that the regula-
tions introduced and kept in place after 
the 1720 bubble probably did more harm 
than good. Banks collapsed frequently, 
but this had few economic consequences 
– precisely because finance played almost 
no role in facilitating the transformation 
of the economy. On balance, tighter reg-
ulation made the British economy more 
stable, but it probably also grew more 
slowly overall. 
Recent work on patterns of growth and 
financial development suggests that these 
insights from the First Industrial Nation 
hold more generally. Ranciere, Tornell, 
and Westermann look at credit expansion 
and economic growth around the globe 
over the last 40 years.13 They examine 
how “skewed” credit growth was – how 
often sharp, sudden declines in credit 
availability occurred. This is one particu-
larly pertinent measure of financial crisis 
– an indicator of a “credit crunch”. 
They then examine systematically if 
countries with more financial crises do 
better or worse economically. Theory 
offers no clear predictions here – it could 
be that more crises create uncertainty 
that produces a systematic drag on eco-
nomic performance. Alternatively, crises 
may be a price to pay for higher growth 
on average, as the British example sug-
gests. Ranciere and coauthors find strong 
evidence in favor of the latter. Figure 4 
shows the growth and credit expansion 
paths of two countries – Thailand and 
India.
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2.8
2.4
2.0
1.6
1.2
0.8
Note: The values for 1980 are normalized to one. The figures display annual credit and per-capita GDP series.
 India   Thailand
Real Credit
Source: Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008)
Fig. 4 Safe vs. risky growth path: A comparison of India and Thailand, 1980–2002
GDP per capita
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02
10
UBS Center Public Paper Fear, Folly, and Financial Crises
A myriad of restrictions and rules have 
stifled the financial sector in India; credit 
relative to GDP is low, and financial cri-
ses have largely been absent over the last 
half-century. In contrast, credit expan-
sion in Thailand was fast, banking rules 
were relatively liberal – and the country 
suffered from wrenching financial crises. 
In particular, it was one of the places the 
East Asian Crisis of 1997/98 most heav-
ily affected. 
In the larger sample of countries, crises 
are more common where financial mar-
kets were liberalized – but growth was 
also more vigorous, mainly because 
credit expanded at a much higher rate. 
This suggests that there is a trade-off 
between financial stability and economic 
growth. Stifling the financial sector 
through rules and regulations can effec-
tively avoid crises – as was the case in 
industrializing Britain, India after 1945, 
and recovering Europe in the Bretton 
Woods era. This does not mean that such 
policies are desirable, since they impose 
serious costs in the form of output not 
produced. Of course, crises themselves 
are associated with significant welfare 
costs. The optimal trade-off between sta-
bility and growth in part depends on the 
safety net in place for those caught in the 
occasional, inevitable downdraft when 
finance plays its role of fuelling economic 
development.
“There is a trade-off between financial stability and 
economic growth, whose optimal balance depends on 
the safety net in place.” 
11
“A crisis can be a good thing.” So said 
Andrew Mellon, multibillionaire and 
Treasury Secretary under President Her-
bert Hoover during the Great Depres-
sion. He felt that the great crisis would 
reduce prices, encourage honest hard 
work, and purge the excesses of the 
“Roaring Twenties” from the economy. 
Mellon’s words are often repeated as an 
example of ministerial callousness. Mel-
lon accepted the downturn and all its 
horrors as an inevitable medicine that 
would help to cure the ills of the Ameri-
can economy.  
The Great Depression eventually came to 
an end – but not before untold suffering 
had been inflicted on millions of ordinary 
citizens suffering from unemployment 
and bankruptcy. Democracy collapsed in 
Germany, which was suffering from a 
similarly brutal downturn, giving way to 
one of the most brutal dictatorships in 
history. It is therefore not surprising that 
there was a general sense of horror and 
dismay when, in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of 2007/08, many impor-
tant economic indicators started to evolve 
in a way that was eerily reminiscent of 
the Great Depression.
In Figures 5–7, taken from the work of 
Kevin O’Rourke and Barry Eichengreen, 
we see output, employment, and trade 
during the Great Recession and the Great 
Depression.14 Initially, all these indica-
tors of economic performance were 
plummeting at a faster pace in 2008/09 
than in 1929/30. And yet, history did not 
repeat itself; what looked like the rerun 
of a horror movie the world had seen in 
the interwar years turned out to be a 
much smaller crisis. Output recovered 
long before it hit a trough of minus 40%, 
as it did during the Great Depression; 
Insight No. 3: Lessons from finan-
cial history can do a world of good
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dinated effort, the panic in financial mar-
kets that marked the year 2008 was 
brought under control.
Learning from history played an impor-
tant role in making sure it did not repeat 
itself. Ben Bernanke’s dissertation was 
devoted to one topic – showing that the 
banking crises that spread throughout the 
US in 1931 and 1932 were key for turn-
ing a garden-variety recession into the 
mother of all economic crises.15 Fettered 
by the rules of the gold standard, the 
Federal Reserve did way too little in the 
1930s to avoid banking failures; as banks 
collapsed and credit declined, firms were 
starved of funds, bankruptcies reduced 
output and boosted unemployment, and 
missing wages contributed to further 
declines in demand. Subsequent research 
has analyzed data at much finer levels of 
disaggregation. Richardson and Troost 
show that banks in adjacent US counties 
performed very differently depending on 
which Federal Reserve District they 
belonged to.16  Those Federal Reserve 
Districts that operated generous liquidity 
support schemes ensured that their banks 
survived – and output suffered much less. 
Furthermore, active interventions by the 
Federal Reserve during a forgotten panic 
in 1929 as a result of a fruit-fly infesta-
tion quickly stemmed the wave of deposit 
withdrawals.17 
Christina Romer, who acted as head of 
the Council of Economic Advisors to 
President Obama from 2009 to 2010, 
showed in her dissertation work that the 
collapse of the stock market in 1929 mat-
tered for economic activity – not because 
speculators were suddenly poorer and 
bought less champagne and caviar, but 
because it heightened uncertainty. She 
showed how economic reports and news-
paper articles reflected a growing sense of 
unease, highlighting the growing down-
side risks for the economy after the great 
stock market crash in October 1929. 
While incomes were initially unaffected, 
patterns of consumption changed quickly 
trade bounced back, and so did stock 
markets. While unemployment surged 
and output in several countries is yet to 
regain its precrisis peak, there was no 
dramatic collapse in economic activity 
overall, and no fraying of the democratic 
system.
While comparing outcomes in only two 
– admittedly important – cases does not 
make for a solid empirical foundation, 
some insights suggest themselves. The 
first and most important one is that a vig-
orous policy response was effective in 
reducing the gravity of the downturn. 
After a period of initial confusion (during 
which the ECB even raised interest rates, 
and Lehman Brothers was allowed to 
fail), central banks everywhere opened 
the spigot of liquidity; no bank was 
allowed to fail because it could not bor-
row in credit markets. Interest rates were 
quickly slashed to values near zero, and 
kept there. Governments injected equity 
into wobbly banks and underwrote vast 
liabilities. As a result of this major, coor-
Great Depression in the US
© Dorothea Lange
Financial crises in the past often had devastating economic and 
social consequences. The picture shows a poor mother with her chil-
dren during the Great Depression in Elm Grove, Oklahoma, USA. It is 
part of the documentary work of Dorothea Lange, an influential Amer-
ican documentary photographer and photojournalist. Her work 
brought the plight of the poor and forgotten to public attention.
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and radically. By November 1929, auto-
mobile purchases were already down 
14%; the decrease amounted to 24% by 
January. At the same time, spending in 
grocery stores continued to grow. The 
more durable a good – the greater the 
size of the necessary financial commit-
ment – the greater the downturn in con-
sumer spending.18 This reflects the 
important effects of uncertainty on 
demand. In contrast to the view of an 
earlier literature that had always cast the 
Great Depression as basically unrelated 
to the Great Crash of 1929, Romer’s 
work proposed a plausible link – one she 
backed up with compelling empirical  
evidence. 
Healing financial markets and getting 
stock prices to recover was also instru-
mental in reducing panic in 2008/09. 
While the stock market after 1929 con-
tinued to slide – with a cumulative fall of 
over 80% by the summer of 1932 – 
stocks recovered from March 2009 
onwards. Banks did not fail by the hun-
dreds as they had during the years 1931 
to 1932. The fact that the Great Reces-
sion did not turn into the Great Depres-
sion, Act II, is in large part a reflection of 
determined policy intervention – a case of 
learning from the past to avoid its repeat.
“The fact that the Great Recession did not turn into the 
Great Depression, Act II, is in large part a reflection of 
determined policy intervention – a case of learning from 
the past to avoid its repeat.”
14
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Insight No. 4: Sovereign debt 
crises are not inevitable – and 
they don’t need to hurt 
Companies fail. Municipalities stop pay-
ing their debts. Private individuals declare 
bankruptcy. These events occur almost 
every day, and they are normally not 
associated with catastrophic declines in 
employment and output. Sovereign debt, 
however, seems different. The risk of a 
sovereign debt crisis is enough to send 
financial markets into a tailspin. Banks 
wobble and output growth often slows. 
Why does not paying contractual obliga-
tions in one case seem to matter for 
aggregate economic performance – but 
not in the other?
One possibility, of course, is that there is 
no causal link running from sovereign 
debt crises to output. Instead, it could 
very well be that poorer performance 
spells lower tax revenues and higher debt 
burdens, which turn into a sovereign debt 
crisis. Sustainability of debt is commonly 
defined as the expected value of future 
primary surpluses. When generating sur-
pluses becomes increasingly uncertain, 
bond investors will be more likely to 
panic; and once they do, rolling over old 
debts becomes impossible, making a full-
fledged sovereign debt crisis inevitable. 
Nonetheless, there is ample evidence for 
a direct link between sovereign debt 
problems and economic performance. 
Greece’s collapse after 2009 only 
occurred after it emerged that the coun-
try had falsified its fiscal accounts. While 
it was not doing well beforehand, the 
downturn once sovereign debt problems 
emerged saw the country going from bad 
to worse. There are a number of reasons 
why sovereign debt can hurt the real 
economy. Banks are typically the “weak-
est link” in the chain, in the parlance of a 
popular British game show. Encouraged 
by regulations that declared government 
debt riskfree, they typically hold large 
quantities of government bonds. When 
their value falls, the banks’ equity posi-
tion is weakened; lending falls, and 
investment is curtailed. Consumers spend 
less, and a downturn begins. 
In addition, highly indebted states often 
have to raise taxes and cut spending 
when faced with a sovereign debt crisis. 
As markets become less willing to buy 
the government bonds, borrowing has to 
be reduced, and interest rates rise. The 
finance minister has to increase revenue 
and reduce spending to ensure that there 
is no default. Of course, the logic of 
“automatic stabilizers” points in exactly 
the opposite direction – governments 
should loosen their purse strings in 
downturns, not tighten them. In other 
words, governments faced with a bond 
market panic often have to engage in 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy, making the cri-
sis worse.
What is the solution? History suggests two 
practical lessons. First, loan syndication 
can be done in such a way as to actually 
achieve risk diversification. Second, banks 
that are not “too big to fail” can antici-
pate and cope with defaults. Third, sover-
eign bond contracts can be structured to 
avoid the need for pro-cyclical policies in 
the middle of a downturn.
Before banks engaged in economic activi-
ties useful to households and firms, expo-
sure to sovereign debt made little 
difference. Philip II of Spain (1556–96) 
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ruled over one of the largest empires in 
history, with territories in the Americas, 
in the Philippines, the Low Countries, 
Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula. His rev-
enues included vast income from the rich-
est silver mines in the world, newly 
discovered in Potosi (in modern-day 
Peru). Despite all his power and wealth, 
Philip went bankrupt no less than four 
times. These bankruptcies show how lim-
ited the effects of major sovereign debt 
crises can be – not one of them created 
an economic downturn.
This is not because he borrowed little. 
Total debt amounted to 60% of GDP or 
so – close to the maximum permitted for 
EMU membership.19 Philip’s bankers were 
not rich enough to finance this debt them-
selves; they syndicated their loans to many 
small and mid-sized investors, who thus 
also bore the brunt of the defaults. When-
ever the king declared a payment stop, the 
bankers were at risk of major losses in 
their own portfolio. At the same time, 
because they (mostly) had not borrowed 
themselves from depositors, they were not 
in risk of bankruptcy themselves. Of 
course, the fact that bankers engaged in 
few economically beneficial activities – 
apart from lending to the sovereign – 
helped to contain the economic fallout. 
Every time the king stopped paying, his 
bankers were naturally up in arms. The 
king accused them of usury; the bankers 
in turn accused Philip of breaking con-
tracts and undermining their livelihoods. 
Negotiations followed, and typically, 
they concluded quickly, within 1–2 years 
(debt renegotiations in modern times take 
much longer, and can last up to 8 years). 
Nonetheless – despite all the complaints 
and recriminations – the same bankers 
continued to lend to Philip II. As a matter 
of fact, they lent at the same terms and 
conditions as before – interest rates 
stayed the same, and lending volume and 
duration were unaffected.
In other words, the defaults were non-
events in terms of the modalities of sover-
eign lending. How can this be? Did the 
king not high-handedly default on what 
would be billions of euros in today’s 
money, with the only purpose of fighting 
expensive foreign wars? The answer is 
that it made good economic sense; on 
average, the bankers all made money – 
lots of it. If we look at the overall return 
for each banking dynasty, not one of 
them is below zero. On average, bankers 
made more than 15% p.a. Payment stops 
and renegotiations took a toll on the 
overall profitability, but they did not 
destroy the economics of the business. As 
a matter of fact, there were few other 
forms of lending that had the potential to 
generate a similar rate of return. This 
also implies that sovereign lending was 
more like an insurance contract com-
bined with a loan; bankers offered sup-
port in times of crisis (reluctantly, but in 
Philip II of Spain (1527–1598)
Source: Web Gallery of Art
Several bankruptcies did little to change his spending nor to the willing-
ness of his bankers to lend him money at nearly constant terms. The 
portrait – painted by Titian circa in 1554 – shows Philip II wearing his 
gold-embroidered costume, decorated with his insignia.
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a way they anticipated), only to receive 
relatively high “insurance premiums” in 
normal periods. Figure 8 shows just how 
profitable lending to Philip II was. We 
compare returns to lenders (over and 
above the return on alternative, “safe” 
investments = excess returns). While 
many lending relationships resulted in 
losses (such as the double-digit losses for 
Argentine investors), lending to Philip II 
was unusually profitable. As a matter of 
fact, compared to the recent history of 
sovereign lending, only investors in Bra-
zilian debt did better.
There is a third lesson from 16th-century 
debt markets that deserves further con-
sideration. One elegant solution to the 
problem of pro-cyclical fiscal policy is to 
issue contingent debt – bonds whose cou-
pon (or repayment) depends on how well 
a country is doing economically. For 
example, interest rates could rise and fall 
with GDP growth. This would allow a 
country to avoid having to make massive 
interest payments in times of crisis, and it 
would compensate investors whenever 
the good times roll. The practical prob-
lems with contingent debt contracts are 
very substantial. Countries could fake 
GDP numbers, for example, to avoid 
having to pay. In general, writing con-
tracts indexed to any number generated 
by a country’s statistical agency is going 
to be challenging. Remarkably, the solu-
tion to these practical problems was rela-
tively simple in the 16th century. Most of 
the short-term debt Philip II issued was 
contingent in nature. It contained clauses 
making repayment (and interest) contin-
gent on the size and arrival date of the 
silver fleet from the Americas, for exam-
ple. Without the annual inflow of silver, 
the king was much poorer – and uncer-
tainty was great. Poor weather, trouble 
with the enslaved indigenous laborers, or 
difficulties in assembling and protecting 
the convoys of galleons filled with silver 
on their long voyage across the Atlantic 
could delay the arrival of the fleet or 
reduce it markedly in size.
Risk sharing worked because no party to 
the debt contract had inside information 
– news travelled at the same speed as the 
boats. Enforcement was easy, however, 
the arrival of the fleet was straightfor-
ward and easy to observe, and both sides 
honored their contractual obligations. In 
other words, the seemingly insurmount-
able incentive and legal problems that 
make the issuance of contingent debt 
nearly impossible today were solved eas-
ily and neatly in the age of the galleon 
and messengers on horseback.20 This sug-
gests that modern debt markets would 
probably do much better if we were to 
take some lessons from the past seriously.
 Brazil,1992–2001
 Asientos to Philip II, 
 1565–96
 Turkey, 1992–2001
 Argentina, 1992–2001
–20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15 20
Source: Drelichmann and Voth (2014)
Fig. 8 “Excess return” on government bonds
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Insight No. 5:  Bubbles can be 
avoided
If there is one form of financial excess that 
seems like a picture-perfect example of 
financial folly, it is bubbles. At the height 
of the NASDAQ bubble, firms that were 
about to become worthless like petfood.
com traded for hundreds of millions of 
dollars; during the Tulip mania, tulip 
bulbs were traded as if they were made of 
precious metal. One simple conceptual 
approach is to say the people periodically 
go crazy, and that is what explains crazy 
prices. This is logically consistent, but it is 
not appealing intellectually. 
One alternative that is popular amongst 
some economists is effectively to define 
the problem away. Every statement about 
the existence of bubbles relies on a model 
of what the “price should be”. If the 
market price coincides, all is well; if not, 
we are inclined to call it a bubble. Since 
agents in financial markets risk their own 
money, there is something awkward 
when journalists, analysts, and econo-
mists claim that a price is out of line, and 
hence, that a bubble has formed – per-
haps, the model of what prices should be 
is simply a poor one? Vocal believers in 
the efficiency of markets – and the inexis-
tence of bubbles – such as Eugene Fama 
also argue that any mispricing that does 
exist would disappear almost instantly, 
as deep-pocketed speculators attack it.
Those who are convinced that bubbles 
exist try to show that prices are so far 
out of line that no conceivably realistic 
scenario in the real world could justify 
them. For example, to justify NASDAQ 
valuations, firms in the entire market seg-
ment would have to generate “super-
profits” of 12% p.a. for a period of 30 
years – above and beyond what normal 
firms typically generated.21 This appears 
unrealistic, not least because actual profits 
were negative for most firms. Even under 
the assumption that firms that were actu-
ally generating losses were as profitable 
as their “old-economy” equivalents, 
price-to-earnings ratios often exceeded 
500 (Figure 9).
One factor, however, speaks against over-
valuations – as the variability of future 
profit growth increases, the fundamental 
value of firms goes up. The reason is that 
a firm can never be worth less than zero 
because of limited liability – shareholders 
never have to pay for the debts of a com-
pany they own, for example. On the 
other hand, firm values can rise to very 
high levels. As the range of possible 
growth rates of profits increases, the 
change in positive values “counts more” 
than the change in negative values – and 
fundamental values rise. While such a 
logic can justify the extraordinary value 
put on individual firms like Amazon, it 
does not help with valuing the whole sec-
tor. This is because many firms explained 
60
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Source: Ofek and Richardson (2003)
Fig. 9 PE ratios of Internet firms at the end of 1999
Implied PE range
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their relevance in terms of “first mover 
advantages”, the idea that only the first 
digital pioneers would strike gold. If so, 
then firms can no longer be valued inde-
pendently. Instead, their values will be 
inversely related – as one succeeds, all the 
others fail. One Amazon can be justified, 
but a whole sector full of Amazon-style 
valuations cannot. 
Sometimes, particular situations in mar-
kets allow us to pin down fundamental 
values with certainty. For example,  
Chinese stocks are only allowed to move 
by a maximum of 10% per day. That 
means that, over a three-day period, 
stocks cannot rise or fall by more than 
30%. Nonetheless, warrants with strike 
prices that are more than 30% away 
from the current price regularly trade at 
non-zero prices in Chinese financial mar-
kets less than three days before expiry. 
This can only be justified by the assump-
tion that “greater fools” will bid up the 
price of inherently worthless options even 
further.22 
What does it take to reduce the frequency 
of bubbles? Here, evidence from experi-
mental settings, combined with data from 
actual market episodes, can be highly use-
ful. Creating bubbles in the lab is not par-
ticularly hard – prices often deviate from 
fundamentals.23 Interestingly, institu-
tional features in the market can influ-
ence both the frequency and size of these 
deviations. One of the key insights from 
this literature is that, the more “lottery-
like” the payoffs of an asset are, the big-
ger bubbles typically get. That means, for 
example, that IPOs of early-stage tech 
firms are natural candidates for bubbles 
because uncertainty is high. A third factor 
compounds problems. Where there are 
few shares available for purchase, “irra-
tional exuberance” in the words of Alan 
Greenspan becomes much more likely. 
During the NASDAQ bubble, for exam-
ple, it was typical that when tech firms 
went public, founders and venture capital 
firms owned the majority of shares and 
that these were “locked up” for a period 
of time. As these shares were released, 
free float increased. As a result, it became 
much easier to short the stock – and as 
the balance between pessimists and opti-
mists shifted, prices began to slide.24 This 
suggests that the price spike would not 
have happened in the first place if supply 
had not been artificially restricted. 
One general insight is that short-sellers can 
do a lot of good. Where short-sellers can 
readily attack mispricings, bubbles are reg-
ularly smaller and less frequent.25 The rea-
son is simple – market prices are like a 
voting contest between optimists and pessi-
mists. With short-selling restrictions, only 
the optimists get to vote, driving prices up. 
Data from the NASDAQ episodes illus-
trates the extreme difficulty that short-sell-
ers faced during the run-up in prices.26 In 
order to be able to short a stock, a specula-
tor must borrow it. Not all shares are 
available for borrowing; the price of 
“Market prices are like a voting contest between opti-
mists and pessimists. With short-selling restrictions, 
only the optimists get to vote, driving prices up. Where 
short-sellers can readily attack mispricings, bubbles 
are regularly smaller and less frequent.”
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obtaining a stock to short it is known as 
the “rebate rate”. Rebate rates in the most 
overvalued parts of the stock market were 
extreme. This shows that many speculators 
tried to attack the mispricing – and found 
it very difficult to do so.24 
Funds that attack a mispricing in the way 
Eugene Fama predicted will first see 
losses if the market moves further away 
from fundamentals. If the trend continues 
for a while, investors may lose faith and 
withdraw funds, leading the fund manag-
ers to reverse their strategy. In an insight-
ful paper, Brunnermeier and Nagel show 
that exactly this happened during the 
NASDAQ bubble – the hedge funds that 
“rode” the bubble did best, and lost  
few investors; those that attacked the 
mispricing saw assets under management 
dwindle, and some even had to close 
shop.27 Had investors stayed with their 
managers just for a few months longer, 
they would have made a fortune. Interest-
ingly, similar things happened during the 
South Sea bubble, almost 300 years ear-
lier. There, too, riding the bubble turned 
out to be the best strategy for investors – 
including those who were convinced that 
the stock had no future in the long run.28 
The following points would help avoid 
bubble formation:
a. avoiding IPOs of very young tech firms 
b. floating stocks with limited free float 
c. making it easier to obtain shares for 
shorting, by, for example, reversing the 
need to “opt into” programs that 
allow borrowing shares 
d. avoiding the common practice of ban-
ning short sales during crises 
e. encouraging hedge funds to have long-
term “lock up” provisions, making it 
harder for investors to take their 
money out at the first sign of under-
performance.
Conclusions
Financial crises devastate human lives, 
causing major losses of wealth and unem-
ployment. What to do about them will  
be one of the defining policy questions of  
the next decade. Public debate is correct 
in strongly discussing financial instability 
and its potential sources. One popular 
interpretation of the origins of financial 
instability is that the frailties of the 
human mind as well as susceptibilities to 
greed and fear make crises inevitable. 
Financial history over the last 800 years 
is often invoked as the key proof for the 
case that financial folly is deeply woven 
“Financial history may hold many lessons, but the  
inevitability of crises is not one of them. Although it is 
relatively easy to stop them, doing so comes at a cost, 
and this cost may be quite high. In other words, the 
right number of financial crises is probably not zero.”
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into the human psyche, and is inevitable.
The American journalist H.L. Mencken 
in the 1920s famously remarked that 
“there is always a well-known solution to 
every human problem – neat, plausible, 
and wrong.” The aftermath of the crisis 
of 2007/08 reminds us that this is still 
true today. Weaknesses of the human 
mind, like the tendency to overestimate 
the likelihood of low-probability events 
or the insufficient updating of priors in 
the face of new information, amplify 
financial crises28 – but these cannot be 
reduced to a constant of human life. 
Financial history may hold many lessons, 
but the inevitability of crises is not one of 
them. 
Clio, the muse of history, suggests that 
crises are not inevitable – given sufficient 
political determination and a will to live 
with adverse consequences, it is relatively 
easy to stop them. Doing so comes at a 
cost, and this cost may be quite high. To 
avoid crises completely, the financial sec-
tor would have to be stifled and regu-
lated to the point where it would 
accomplish little of economic value; 
growth inevitably suffers. In other words, 
the right number of financial crises – the 
frequency that a policy-maker should aim 
for – is probably not zero. For every eye-
catching crisis avoided, there is more 
poverty, more social exclusion, and more 
unemployment than would otherwise be 
the case. 
The aftermath of the 2007/08 Great 
Recession demonstrates eloquently that 
policy-makers can learn from history. 
Drawing the right lessons from the 1930s 
was essential in avoiding a much more 
severe downturn – one that could easily 
have occurred had it not been for ener-
getic policy intervention, guided by 
detailed knowledge of what made the 
Great Depression truly “great”. Simi-
larly, there is scope for reducing the fre-
quency of sovereign debt crises and the 
size and incidence of bubbles if we listen 
to Clio’s whispers. Sovereign debt con-
tracts can be made much more resilient, 
by reducing banks’ exposure to govern-
ment bonds, by making risk transfers 
actually effective, and by writing contin-
gent debt contracts that reduce the pro-
cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
In the same vein, much can be done to 
reduce the size and frequency of bubble 
episodes. The risk of bubbles is much 
lower where artificial short-selling restric-
tions are avoided, shares of new firms 
come to market only once they are rela-
tively mature and profitable, and a large 
number of shares can be traded with 
ease. In addition, perverse incentive 
effects that come from delegating the 
management of funds to professional 
managers can be reduced. All of these 
factors will level the playing field 
between optimists and pessimists, allow 
speculators to attack mispricings effec-
tively, and increase the overall stability of 
financial markets. 
The Swiss art historian Jakob Burckhardt 
famously argued that the purpose of his-
tory was not to be smart the next time, 
but to be “wise forever”. Financial crises 
will continue to be among the most vex-
ing problems in modern economies; lis-
tening to Clio’s wisdom will make it 
easier to reduce their number, soften their 
consequences, and appreciate why regu-
lating them out of existence would be a 
really bad idea.
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